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ABSTRACT
Usability engineering is situated in a much larger social and insti-
tutional context than is usually acknowledged by usability profes-
sionals in the way that they define their field. e definitions and
processes used in the improvement of user interfaces are subor-
dinate to interests that oen have narrow goals, having adverse
effects on user awareness and autonomy that have further adverse
effects on society as a whole. ese effects are brought about by
the way that knowledge about systems is limited by the design
of the interface that limits the user to tasks and goals defined by
organizations, oen commercial ones.
It is the point at which the structures of the user interface are
defined by usability professionals that sources of the limitation of
knowledge can be identified. ese sources are defined by their
reliance on a construction of the user’s wants and needs that cycli-
cally reinforce, through the actual use of the interface, the user’s
own construction of her wants and needs. To alleviate this, it is
necessary to come up with new processes of user interface design
that do not make assumptions about the user that tend to subordi-
nate the user, and it is also necessary to reconstruct the user as a
participant in the interface.
is paper is intended as a philosophical critique, as described
above, of the concept of usability engineering. It is also occasion-
ally illustrated with examples of relevant situations involving the
social and political effects of usability engineering.
NOTE: is article was wrien in 2003 as a final project for a Mas-
ter’s course in human-computer interaction at the University of Ot-
tawa. e author aempted to publish it at the time, but did not
really understand the process. e ideas stand up fairly well, how-
ever, and he would like to contribute it as a comment on the current
state of affairs. It is only lightly edited for format.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the years, work in various areas of science and engineering
has become increasingly subject to public scrutiny over the effects
it may have on the environment, on individuals, and on society.
e public as a whole has begun to recognize that while the act
of scientific observation and analysis itself may be value-neutral
(subject to caveats of scientific ethics), the context in which science
and engineering are conducted is oen not. estions arise about
the benefits such research may bring and what harm. ese ques-
tions are political ones and arise in debates about values. It thus
behooves those who work in science and engineering to examine
carefully the ideological assumptions under which they choose to
conduct research and how they intend for their work to be applied.
Genetic engineering is an obvious and recent case in point. es-
tions about biodiversity, effects on human health, economic effects,
and so on have reached a point where researchers must pay aen-
tion and recognize the effect that their work has on society and
the role of politics in their research agenda—and that is just for
agricultural genetic engineering. We have barely begun to scratch
the surface of themoral, social, and political implications of human
germline engineering; it has everything frommedical implications
to implications for class and social structure, and it is thus a cyno-
sure of public debate on science as well as the fuel of any number
of science-fiction novels.
What makes this science so politically significant? Part of the
answer is that it either directly touches the lives of human beings
or has future implications that will. is is the case, to a greater
or lesser degree, with other scientific and engineering research en-
deavours. Usability engineering and the study thereof is a compo-
nent of soware engineering that is explicitly devoted to studying
the relationship between computer systems and users. As such,
it is one of the points at which the several fields oen known as
information technology have a more direct impact on people and
society.
Unfortunately, usability professionals and researchers appear
oen to discuss deeply political and philosophical questions with
only an eye toward narrow usability goals, seemingly not recog-
nizing the relationship between their work and writing and larger
questions of power and society. For example, in a recent panel
discussion at CHI [1], Janice Rohn and Don Norman argued for
a considerable period of time about how to gain influence within
organizations by aligning themselves with powerful forces in the
organization: who are these powerful forces, what are their val-
ues, and so on. But the idea that this context of values may in-
fluence the direction and goals of usability work does not appear
to be a major factor in their discussion; it is taken as a given that
usability should primarily benefit the organization and not the in-
dividual user or the society in which the organization exists. In-
deed, Norman proposes that usability engineers acquire business
administration education, an education that is laden with the val-
ues of management. However, all is not lost: Rohn aempts to
aribute “feature bloat” in Microso products to Microso’s mo-
nopolistic control of the market; Norman, however, aempts to
redirect blame to non-political factors.
Unstated or unexamined political ideas appear to surround or
bracket discussions of usability in oen quite blatant ways. For
instance, the moo of the 2001 CHI conference was “anyone. any-
where.” is statement appeared in bold text in the footer of papers
published in the conference proceedings. In this simple statement
is packed a variety of potential meanings
• that anyone can apply usability techniques to any context.
• that everyone should apply usability techniques to every
relevant context.
• that such things can benefit anyone, anywhere.
• that usability research is already directed toward making
technology accessible to everyone.
• that this is clearly a major goal.
Whether or not these implied claims are true is the maer at hand,
though it will take far more than this report to support or deny
all of them. But it serves as further illustration the importance of
context and contextual assumptions in discussions of usability.
is is one example of well-known usability professionals either
ignoring or merely scratching the surface of the political questions
of their claims. However, there are writers in the field of usability
who have tried to direct aention to usability in the context of
wider social goals. Carroll and Rosson [3], for instance, discuss
the extension of usability evaluation techniques from the study
of interactions between individual users of the systems in ques-
tion to the integrated study of wide-ranging groups of people in
their larger scale indirect interactions through the system. ey
seek to extend usability evaluation to handle the heterogeneous
environments that do not always reflect the relative uniformity of
the traditional business organizations. ey discuss the applica-
tion of these techniques to the evaluation of community networks,
and they connect such evaluation to the improvement of the social
utility of computer systems, given an understanding that in some
modern societies, there is a “crisis of community,” wherein peo-
ple’s integration with local community life is being stifled by the
exigencies of the modern daily existence. In this case, it becomes
important to see, among other things, whether or not community
networks are being used in such a way that they serve community
goals or whether or not they are being used as on-ramps to other
unrelated services.
While it is clear that there is a growing trend in seeing usability
issues in social terms, however, there are still areas of socially sig-
nificant usability assumptions that have not yet been questioned.
is report will deal with a small number of them.
1.1 Objectives
e component of the debate about usability that I intend to focus
on most closely in this report is the politics of users’ knowledge
of the system and how it influences user interface design goals.
Specifically, I intend to give a brief introduction to arguments
• that definitions of usability are relative to the world-view
of the usability professional, as partially explained above.
• that this world-view assumes that users are static entities
defined by goals of organizations.
• that this is connected to power relationships in human so-
ciety.
• that these relationships depend on limiting knowledge.
• that expanding the the flow of knowledge to the user (in-
deed, making more demands on the user) can have a sub-
versive effect on power relationships in society.
It is important to note that I am specifically acknowledging a goal
here: the empowerment of users to the detriment of interests that
already have power over them. It is not necessary for the reader to
agree with the way that this goal has been defined, but it should be
noted that oen other writers’ goals, as seen above, are not defined
even if they exist.
2 USABILITY AND GOALS
I have spent the previous section introducing the relevance of so-
cial and political goals to usability engineering. However, in light
of the objectives above, it behooves me to narrow down the dis-
cussion to the goals against which I intend to evaluate aspects of
contemporary usability engineering. Aer this, I will discuss how
narrow definitions of usability depend on the particularization of
users and users’ knowledge and its subjugation to organizational
goals. ereaer, I will discuss the social impacts of user interfaces
that narrow the information flow.
2.1 Politically Motivated Goals
ere are different kinds of goals, but in particular they can be
classified by their nature as general or situation-specific. Carroll
and Rosson, for instance, define a set of social goals to inform the
evaluation of a specific type of system created to alleviate a partic-
ular social problem that they felt the need to address—community
networks for solving the crisis of community. But Muller et al. [8]
do not have a specific type of system to evaluate. ey instead
discuss systems in a business context with the view that the val-
ues of business cause usability analysis to see the relationship be-
tween humans and computers primarily in terms of “productiv-
ity and efficiency,” a “Tayloristic” approach. ey would prefer to
see an alternative characterization of work expressed as the qual-
ity of three things: work product, work life, and communication.
ey set quality of the work product against productivity, since in-
creasing productivity may lead to a decline in quality; they define
quality of work life in terms of the intangible psychological effects
felt by the user; and they express the quality of communication
in how computer systems affect the user’s communications with
other entities involved in the organization, such as customers or
executives.
Only two of these three values are justified in terms of the user
or any human environment surrounding the user. And unfortu-
nately, they still justify these criteria in terms of economic goals;
for instance, they justify the idea of designing user interfaces that
improve the quality ofwork life in terms of the enthusiasm brought
by the user to his or her work in the organization. So this general
view of making use of “non-Tayloristic” values in user interface
evaluation still has the side effect of reinforcing a business goals,
not social goals.
So Carroll and Rosson [3] have a broad social view but a specific
goal, while Muller et al. [8], starting with a radical hypothesis, ul-
timately lead to a business-oriented view but one that applies to
more general usability evaluation issues. But it would be beer if
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there was a way to provide a broad social view that informs us-
ability analysis in general and not just for specific circumstances,
finding the equator between these two poles. What sort of goals
are these? As suggested in section 1.1, they are, among others,
goals relating to the distribution of power between individuals, a
distribution that can be affected and effected by the information
that is provided by the user interface. en the goal becomes to
design in such a way
• that recognizes that power is enforced in organizations by
limiting certain kinds of knowledge.
• that is based on recognizing the places in the design that
limit such knowledge.
• that is willing to limit reliance on certain traditional goals
of user interface design, such as “ease of use,” that may
oen depend on limiting knowledge to the end user.
On what sort of knowledge, then, is this goal predicated? If it is
simply the knowledge that must be imparted to the user in order
to perform his or her specific tasks—that is, domain knowledge—
then there is no particular significance to these goals. Under any
reasonable set of design goals, if domain knowledge is not being
correctly imparted by the user interface, then there is a problem.
No, in this case, the knowledge in question is knowledge of how
the system works, knowledge that would normally be confined to
system designers, implementers, and expert users.
Why is it important for this knowledge to be exposed to end
users? Some of this question will be answered in a later section
(2.3). However, to give a concrete example from consumer so-
ware, consider the growing use of popular soware on the Inter-
net that sends data back to its manufacturer (KaZaa figures among
these). In this case, many users are not aware what kind of infor-
mation is being sent for data mining purposes. It is likely that they
are not aware that a program can monitor their activities with-
out their knowledge and transmit it without their explicit actions.
As we move into a more paranoid security situation with more
government surveillance and scrutiny of everyday life, it is neces-
sary that consumers becomemore aware of these things; designing
other, more ethical Internet applications that do not hide so much
of the underlying Internet reality from end users may be a step in
the direction of user interfaces that promote social goals and social
change.
Now, one may claim that this way of characterizing and justi-
fying design goals are simply relative to the person holding them
and an entirely subjective manner. Why should usability profes-
sionals be concerned about these goals? e answer is to say, yes,
these are relative to the views of individuals, and there is indeed a
subtext of social radicalism in their construction. However, this is
a maer of degree; most people would likely view at least the en-
couragement of user understanding of security-related maers to
be a positive effect. But ultimately, the actual moral value of such
goals goes into philosophy and beyond the scope of this report.
2.2 Usability and Roles
How is system knowledge apportioned and limited? How do cur-
rent concepts of usability engineering help to encourage this state
of affairs? is is inextricably tied up in how usability profession-
als see themselves and their field, as with Rohn and Norman are
described to do in the interview mentioned in introduction to this
document [1]. I will therefore discuss a definition of usability and
usability engineering as provided by Butler, who seeks to describe
usability engineering’s past accomplishments and rise to impor-
tance [2].
To begin with, Butler [2] defines usability to be the “effective-
ness of interaction between human operators and their machines.”
Butler aempts to define this in objective terms by claiming that
this effectiveness reflects “how well intended users can master and
perform tasks on the system,” given empiricalmeasurement brought
to bear by the observation of “actual user performance of frequent
and critical tasks on the system.” Usability engineering, therefore,
is a “new discipline” that serves “to address system usability in a
reliable and replicable manner.”
It is important to note that Butler provides this definition only
aer he provides background information about the larger context
of usability in much the same way that I have arrived at this point
of definition aer describing the larger context in which I intend
this discussion. However, he is not at all self-conscious about the
nature of his background. He specifies his primary motive in the
idea of the success of a system, clearly defined in terms of its com-
mercial value on the marketplace or its cost to a buyer.
Howdoes poor usability cost the buyer? According to Butler [2],
it can cause businesses to lose opportunities to “re-engineer their
processes.” e work that a user does is defined in terms of the in-
stitution; the value of the user interface is entirely contingent on
how it allows the user to serve the institution, and, more abstractly,
how it allows the institution to manipulate the environment of the
user, as represented by the processes of the business organization.
Indeed, “work pressures” give the user less time to learn the inter-
face, making usability crucial to efficiency and reducing overhead.
Task analysis is one of the main tools which Butler expects us-
ability professionals to use in order to provide information as to
how the interface should be designed. But these tasks are appor-
tioned by the organization. In fact, it is the tasks that apportion
users into different roles in the organization—indeed, that is one
way that organizational roles can be defined: by the tasks they im-
ply. In other words, usability as seen by Butler, whose article [2]
is devoted to discussing recent trends, is not only defined by the
tasks that the user must perform, but it also partially circumscribes
the user’s role. It is designed, by its reliance on task analysis to im-
prove business efficiency, to reinforce aspects of society that are
by their very nature political and philosophical.
By what mechanism does usability come to define the role of
the user? Butler notes that an important part of usability work is
determining what should be automated by the machine and what
should be performed directly by the user. is is one direct way of
limiting the user’s role. But what about the interface itself? Does
it contain some characteristic that constrains the user and helps
to subordinate the user to the goals of the institution? Part of the
answer to this is the way in which user interfaces constrain the ac-
cess of the user to knowledge about the system, an issue to which
I have alluded in the previous section and to which I will return in
section 2.3. Furthermore, it is the presupposition of the organiza-
tional roots of tasks that cause usability analyses to prescribe user
interfaces that promote these constraints.
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2.3 Effects of Limiting Knowledge
By now I have reached a point where I have described usability
as a force that affects the user’s power the define his or her own
role in the organization and in society—in other words, notions
of usability can constrain the user’s knowledge and therefore the
user’s power. However, I have not as yet described some of the
means by which this is accomplished.
Much of the answer is discussed by Johnson-Eilola [7]. He is
concerned most directly with training and documentation aspects
of computer systems, but he also applies his ideas to the philosoph-
ical underpinnings of user interface design as well.
Johnson-Eilola notes that as users have come to expect that com-
puter technology becomes increasingly automated and “anticipates
our every desire,” it becomes more difficult—“pointless”—for users
to “think critically about the operation of the machine and our po-
sition within it.” Indeed, users become less aware of how technolo-
gies “construct positions that users assume” the more invisible the
workings of technology seem to be. In other words, users come to
expect that technology will automatically satisfy their needs, re-
quiring less and less participation on their part.
Designers of soware respond to these expectations by design-
ing is such a way that “users shouldn’t have to think.” But this
creates a vicious cycle, as it reinforces that very expectation. As
users come to expect that their contribution in terms of effort and
thought will be reduced, users become less and less capable of
defining the reasons for what they expect. Johnson-Eilola refers
to this situation as the “politics of amnesia.”
Is amnesia always bad? Should the user be involved in every de-
tail of the operation of the system? Where is automation-induced
amnesia a good thing and where is it bad? Johnson-Eilola notes
that modern society requires such a complex flow of information
that it is impossible that human beings be required to process all
of it. But the cycle that causes designers of user interfaces and
writers of documentation to reduce the flow of information to the
user tends to a limit where the user is deprived of any information
that would allow the construction of a mental model of the system.
“Amnesia” is not always a bad thing, but Johnson-Eilola wants to
identify the ways in which user interfaces go too far rather than
help users to “actively build memories and experiences.”
In section 2.1, I briefly gave an example of situations in which
the user’s lack of a mental model of Internet communication leads
to situations in which the user’s data can be exploited by common
soware that communicates without the user’s consent. I gave
the example of the music-finding soware, KaZaa, and this piece
of soware illustrates this point quite well. KaZaa is a program
whose purpose it is to automate as much as possible the user’s
search for music and other files; not only does its automation ex-
ploit the user’s data, it itself reinforces the paerns that give rise
to the user’s lack of knowledge.
But KaZaa is a minor example of the unknowing loss of auton-
omy experienced by the user. A much larger example is that of
email standards and the marketplace. is is discussed in detail by
Jakobs et al. [6] in their paper on the relationship between users
and the standardization process that focuses on the reluctance of
organizations (here apparently defined as a sufficient representa-
tive of the user) to become involved in standards bodies. While
Jakobs et al. describe a number of reasons for this phenomenon
with respect to email standards, one of them is that the organiza-
tions and the people responsible for seing up email therein are
used to viewing email through the products and services being
used to provide it.
is necessarily makes the user interface of these products the
main arbiter of how email and email standards are viewed by the
end user. Since leading commercial email packages such as Mi-
croso Exchange tend to obscure the challenges that are faced
in other, heterogeneous environments where multiple email pack-
ages are used, the user organization becomes increasingly less aware
of the issues of interoperability that standards are intended to solve.
is reinforces reliance on proprietary products, which in turn re-
inforces the lack of awareness, in a similar cycle as the politics of
amnesia. As such products as Microso Exchange are generally
integrated with other Microso products, it further increases the
prevalence of Microso in the organization, leading to the near-
monopoly that Microso presently has in the marketplace1. is
demonstrates how user knowledge and the politics of amnesia has
an effect on user choices and the technological situation.
In a sense, the subordination of the concept of usability to in-
stitutional goals creates a series of interlocking amnesiac cycles of
various scales (from KaZaa tomonopolies) that inhibit a practice of
usability that realizes the goal of returning autonomy to the user.
e remaining task is to locate the conjunction of these cycles, the
point which they all have in common, in order to diminish their
effects.
3 USERS, DESIGN, AND KNOWLEDGE
I have accomplished the main task of discussing some ways in
which usability engineering and the goals and assumptions behind
it control knowledge in such a way that the user is inadvertently
subordinated to institutional goals. But there is the remaining task
of explaining the aspects of user interface design that wherein the
control of knowledge is actually implemented.
e fundamental link in the chain of stifling invisibility are the
design practices followed by usability professionals in the way that
they choose to arrange and structure user interfaces; while these
practices are informed by their unacknowledged political under-
standings, they could have no understanding or reinforcement with-
out a point at which they become real. Task analysis and other or-
ganizationally embedded processes do not have any relevant effect
on reality until the work of building the user interface is accom-
plished.
Consequently, in the remainder of this section, I will discuss
the flaws with the philosophy of user interface design that appear
to be prevalent in usability engineering; I will discuss a potential
way of alleviating these flaws through by re-orienting established
design heuristics; and I will expand the discussion not only to the
interface itself, but to reconstructing the user as a participant in
the interface.
1I take it here for granted that monopolies are bad. e negative economic, social,
and technological impact of monopolies are beyond the scope of this report.
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3.1 Invisibility and Design
Johnson-Eilola [7] goes on to discuss the aspects of the politics
of amnesia that cause these effects as they are expressed in docu-
mentation and user interfaces. He notes that the most important
technologies that human beings use are the most invisible and
used without thought: “It’s hard to argue with something that’s
not there.” But when it comes to user interfaces, the invisibility
that defeats user awareness is oen a design choice. According
to Johnson-Eilola, designers and documenters operate on “Shan-
non and Weaver’s” communication model from the 1940s. In this
model, the sender imparts information to a receiver through a lim-
ited channel; the task of the receiver is simply to present itself.
Very few models of communication involving human beings rely
on this view of the human receiver, having instead complexmodels
of the receiver’s response, interpretation, social situation, and so
on. But the fact that this model is simple for designers to conceive
and happens generally to “work well enough” to help most users
to accomplish their desired tasks allows this model to persist.
e first component of the expression of the Shannon-Weaver
model in user interface design is summed up by Johnson-Eilola as
“Do as I say, not as I do.” In Johnson-Eilola’s specific area of com-
puter documentation, this aspect of invisibility is expressed in the
way that documentation writers measure the success of their texts:
the ease at which the users are able to follow the instructions. But
most documentationwriters are also aware that users interact with
texts in an oen highly creative process, by doing such things as
linking the information in the texts to prior experiences. So users
are paradoxically encouraged to view the text as trivial while the
information in the texts become more complex with the technol-
ogy.
I can easily extrapolate this to user interface design beyond doc-
umentation. e invisibility of technology as produced by automa-
tion is a result of designing the interface to satisfy the user’s desire
for simplicity while enabling the user to perform complex actions
in such a way that telescopes complexity into user actions that
minimize the user involvement. ough invisibility is not always
bad, it is the assumption that this paradox must always be satisfied
in favour of simplicity that leads to design decisions that produce
invisibility that reduces the ability of the user to imagine a social
criticism.
is telescoping of complexity leads into the second component
of the denial of the receiver/user’s agency produced by a Shannon-
istic model. Once again, to put it in Johnson-Eilola’s pithy word-
ing [7], “real learning disappears in the collapse of time.” Johnson-
Eilola emphasizes the difference between learning and being trained.
Learning implies an aempt at increasing the possibility of future
creative use of the acquired knowledge; but merely to be trained is
to acquire knowledge in such a way that it is only useful for a par-
ticular task. Johnson-Eilola uses the example of a hammer: should
the use of the hammer be taught only sufficiently to succeed in the
task of banging nails, or should it be taught in such a way that al-
lows the hammer’s user to acquire carpentry skills in the future?
To Johnson-Eilola, the laer is clearly themore desirable option—it
is the true learning.
In the desire to improve efficiency, whose nature with respect
to user interfaces has been discussed in previous sections, the time
required for documentation to impart knowledge is oen reduced
to the time required for training, not learning [7]. Once again, this
can be extrapolated to user interface design. Aspects of the user in-
terface that can be designed to teach (that is, bring about real learn-
ing) are instead co-opted into performing tasks in an invisible man-
ner. Johnson-Eilola brings up the example of “wizards,” tools that
can be used to allow the system to engage in complex interactions
with the user. In their potential to expand the user’s understanding
of the system by revealing through interactions what the system is
accomplishing, instead wizards are typically given the role of au-
tomating for the user complex tasks that do not lend themselves
well to this sort of automation. Microso Word, for instance, con-
tains many wizards for creating different kinds of documents, but
these wizards do not discuss well how and why these documents
are structured so that learning—and therefore user autonomy—can
ensue.
A last issue brought up by Johnson-Eilola that can be trans-
lated into this discussion is that of the “collapse of critical distance”
brought about by the expectations of speed: “At the speed of light,
time ceases to be an issue.” From the point of view that I am pre-
senting, it is impossible for users to regain autonomy and power,
to reduce the negative effects of the politics of invisibility and am-
nesia, if their capacity for criticizing the system’s wider effects is
diminished. e time expectations of the user, that “the distance
between desire and result should be zero” [7], are cyclically rein-
forced to produce a situation wherein the user does not even have
the opportunity to criticize. Johnson-Eilola discusses the tendency
of word processing and other productivity tools to move impor-
tant interface elements from invisible places such as menus to im-
mediately visible places such as tool-bars. It may seem paradoxi-
cal, but this kind of change from apparent invisibility to visibility—
reducing the need for the user to search through menus—actually
serves to increase the overall invisibility of the context of actions
and the whole menu arrangement of action, decreasing the critical
distance of the user.
I have thus used Johnson-Eilola’s ideas to characterize the na-
ture and effects of three components of the Shannonistic approach
to user interface design:
• Designing so that complex tasks are performed in decep-
tively simple ways destroys the possibility of creative and
critical interaction with the system.
• Focusing design on specific tasks reduces the opportunity
for real learning.
• In making actions more easily available to the user, there
is a price to be paid in terms of encouraging user assump-
tions and reducing the opportunity for thought.
As these issues are in conflict with the goals laid out in section 2.1
and serve, in the long term, to subordinate the user in ways dis-
cussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, we need to revise the approach to
user interface design in order to diminish the effects of a Shannon-
istic model.
3.2 Beneficial Complexity
e primary purpose of this report has been from the beginning to
discuss the concept of usability from a political and philosophical
standpoint. However, I shall now briefly turn to what is an even
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Mac Anti-Mac
Metaphors Reality
Direct Manipulation Delegation
See and Point Describe and Command
Consistency Diversity
WYSIWYG Represent Meaning
User Control Shared Control
Feedback and Dialog System Handles Details
Forgiveness Model User Actions
Aesthetic Integrity Graphic Variety
Modelessness Richer Cues
Table 1: Mac vs. Anti-Mac design principles; aer Gentner
and Nielsen.
more complicated discussion of what to do about the critique, relat-
ing it to ideas that already exist in the usability literature but were
not necessarily intended to be used to implement a philosophical
programme.
ere are a number of techniques used to design user interfaces,
but one particularly interesting one is the use of design heuristics.
Heuristics aempt to present a manageable set of guidelines that
capture good practices in user interface design; they can be used
both in prototyping and in evaluation. Heuristics present a boiled-
down encoding of how user interface professionals view the struc-
ture of the user interface, and thus they present a useful target for
reform. From such a change, there can be a re-evaluation of the
larger construction of the concept of usability.
An interesting proposal for altering the way we see user inter-
faces comes from Gentner and Nielsen [4]. ey discuss the his-
tory of user interface design guidelines as they have supported the
WIMP (windows, icons, menus, pointers) model with the view that
the reliance on certain guidelines has stymied the production of
new user interface paradigms beyond WIMP. In effect, their con-
cern is not social like the motivation behind this article; neverthe-
less, there is potential in their proposal for a politically-aware prac-
tice of usability engineering.
For Gentner and Nielsen [4], an important exemplar of modern
user interface design guidelines are those for the Macintosh, pub-
lished by Apple in the 1992 (though they appear to be much older).
ese design guidelines were set under certain assumptions, some
of which involved the need for the guidelines to help Apple to sell
products to users. Gentner and Nielsen wish to perform a thought
experiment: what if user interface design was performed under
heuristics that violated those guidelines? ey call these the “Anti-
Mac” heuristics and proceed to define and contrast them with the
Mac interface guidelines. Table 1 lists these contrasted principles
by name.
Some of these principles bear directly on the maer at hand.
e Mac principle of See and Point, wherein the user is limited to
clicking on only the presented objects, represents a form of limi-
tation on the user that coincides with invisibility; the user can do
nothing but what is presented there, which may be very limited
in relation to what the user may eventually wish to do. e Anti-
Mac principle of Describe and Command, however, represents the
view that language is central, that subordinating the user to a lim-
ited, “easy,” interface is a step back in human communications; in
the Anti-Mac interface, Gentner and Nielsen suggest, the user can
instead compose commands in a simple language (so as not to set
the infeasible requirement that computers understand the entirety
of human language) that express a much broader range of interac-
tions than See and Point. e use of language can help to return
control over complex actions to the user, rather than requiring that
the complex actions be inscribed in the interface itself.
Another contrast between the Mac design guidelines and Gen-
tner and Nielsen’s Anti-Mac guidelines is the role of WYSIWYG.
WYSIWYG stands for the well-known dictum, “What You See Is
What You Get,” so that what is displayed represents as closely as
possible what needs to be produced aer the user performs her
tasks (such as an image of a printed page in a word processor). But
as Gentner and Nielsen [4] point out, oen this merely translates
to “What You See Is All YouGet.” eMac guidelines specifyWYSI-
WYG; the Anti-Mac guidelines focus on representing the meaning
of interface objects that appear to the user. Indeed, Gentner and
Nielsen call for Anti-Mac systems to have richer internal and exter-
nal representations of objects withwhich the user interacts. Richer
internal representations are needed because the freedom of interac-
tion produced by a language-oriented user interface requires more
complex information about the objects. A richer external represen-
tation with more complex ways of interacting with objects allows
the user greater autonomy and freedom in using the objects. From
the point of view of autonomy as a social good, richer internal
and external representations of user objects allow users to expand
their use beyond the tasks intended by the designers of the inter-
face, reducing their subordination to the interests that establish
the requirements of the design.
Not all is well, however, with the Anti-Mac guidelines. A Mac
design guideline is Feedback and Dialog. Contrasted to this is the
Anti-Mac guideline of System Handles Details. Defined any rea-
sonable way, leing the system handle the details of an action pro-
motes a form of invisibility-inducing automation. e Mac guide-
lines, however, are more inclusive of the user as a participant in
the process. e situation can be rectified somewhat by leing
the system handle the details in such a way that the user remains
informed about the actions that the system is taking, as well as
allowing the user control over the nature of the automation itself—
once again implying a need for the expressive power of language
in scripting or some othermedium. Nevertheless, while containing
some aspects that further an agenda of user power and autonomy,
the priorities of Gentner and Nielsen are considerably more tradi-
tional.
Gentner and Nielsen [4] mention that ultimately the Anti-Mac
interface is designed for users with a greater level of expertise than
the Mac interface. Considering the current levels of computer use
by young people, they assume that in the future, a greater and
greater proportion of the populationwill be classed as expert users.
en the trade-off between ease-of-use and power will be much
easier to make.
But to assume that this will be the case also assumes that exper-
tise will be generated without social change. In order for users to
regain autonomy and critical distance, it is not enough that more
complex user interface paradigms be implemented passively over
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time. is passive mode envisioned by Gentner and Nielsen does
not optimally raise the consciousness of the user to a state of au-
tonomy from the parameters of the institutionally-oriented task
analysis performed in the user interface design. Instead, an active
mode of creating expertise is required, a user interface design par-
adigm that does not merely allow the user to take advantage of
powerful features, but rather encourages and pushes the user into
a heightened awareness of the capabilities of the system. (e ben-
efit of this is explored in section 3.3.)
Already there are interfaces that display some of the Anti-Mac
characteristics: the user interfaces for current Unix and Linux sys-
tems. e extensive reliance on command prompts even in graphi-
cal situations takes advantage of the power of language, albeit per-
haps in a less forgiving way than that envisioned by Gentner and
Nielsen. And it may verywell be a less forgiving user interface that
is necessary to create user growth and empowerment, a user inter-
face that reflects more closely the underlying state of the system
and thus the possibilities for autonomy that emerge therefrom.
3.3 Expertise and Empowerment
Mention was made in section 3.1 of the practice of indulging the
user’s own desire for simplicity and efficiency at the expense of
critical distance and autonomy; it has also been noted that focusing
on satisfying this desire creates this desire, as the ability to learn
and to criticise becomes increasingly less possible. So we must not
only begin to reformulate the heuristics of user interface design,
which is one half the equation, but also how we deal with users.
Furthermore, an agenda of beneficial complexification runs the
risk of reversing some positive social gains made by simplified user
interfaces, in particular the accessibility of the user interfaces to
disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities. Rather than
sacrifice the goal of increasing user involvement in computer sys-
tems, we should rather seek to understand why it is that these
groups are excluded from technology in the first place.
It is well known that for most of recorded history, technology
has been defined ultimately as a masculine space. Technological
spaces have generally excluded women; women are still vastly
in the minority in computer science and electrical engineering,
among other “technology-heavy” fields. In his discussion of an
aempt to increase women’s involvement in technology [5], Her-
man notes that some radical feminists have taken the masculin-
ity of technological spaces as fundamental to technology, seeing,
among other things, how it has generally been very closely con-
nected to such historically masculine institutions as the military-
industrial complex. In a sense, if one takes this viewpoint to its
limit, opening technological spaces to women can oen be con-
structed as a masculine intrusion on women’s spaces, supplanting
a transgressive act.
is viewpoint also ignores the fact that there have been tech-
nologies that also have liberated women—not perfectly, but they
have allowed women to resist patriarchal institutions. ere is a
kind of technological dialectic whereby, indeed, women’s techno-
logical gains can be co-opted. But in this technological world, it
is necessary that women be able to reclaim technological spaces,
if only for the fact that both men’s and women’s lives are deeply
affected by it. Indeed, such a transgression is an essential part of
the critique of the social effects of technology.
Herman [5] describes an organization in Manchester, England,
called the Women’s Electronic Virtual Hall (WEVH). e WEVH
was part of a wider set of Electronic Virtual Halls (EVH) intended
to make technology more accessible to disadvantaged groups. One
of the successes of theWEVH, as described byHerman, is the intro-
duction of women participants to technology in a direct and hands-
onway, not just as a tool but as an item of interest in itself. Courses
were offered in which women without prior technical experience
were encouraged to touch technology, to be involved with tech-
nology not just as a transgressive act but as a normal experience;
these courses involved training women in such things as assem-
bling the internal hardware of computers (motherboards and so
on), plugging together PCs, seing up networks, trouble-shooting,
and maintenance—not just using the computer, but being involved
in it.
It is the promotion of expertise that allows the completion of the
other side of the usability equation as discussed in this paper—not
just expecting that users be passive consumers of computer tech-
nology, wholly determined and constructed by their experience of
the user interface, but rather that, as active agents, they too are
a partner in the construction of the usability. Expecting nothing
from the users but the completion of their tasks is precisely the
self-reinforcing Tayloristic goal that usability engineers seem not
to question, as I have discussed near the beginning of this paper—it
is associated with the ubiquitous obsession with productivity and
efficiency, not autonomy and creativity. Women who participated
in the WEVH are now beer empowered to participate in the tech-
nological world not merely as users, but as critical thinkers; they
aremore likely tomigrate from being users who are constructed by
usability engineers to being users aware of their own construction
and the construction of technology as an influence on society.
Ultimately, invisibility must be challenged both from the design
of the interface and from the perspective of the user.
4 CONCLUSION
In section 1.1, I discussed my main goal in this paper which was
to provide brief introductions to five political and philosophical
ideas regarding usability, knowledge and power. In the following
sections, I proceeded to fulfill each of these objectives in somemea-
sure. I discussed a mainstream definition of usability in the context
of current work. I discussed the goals of usability engineering in
order to lead into a discussion expanding these goals to a practice
that serves to challenge the social order rather than serving the so-
cial order. I gave examples of both subtle and blatant exertions of
power between varying interests in society, and I connected these
to the way in which knowledge flows between these interests. And
finally, I discussed the ways in which this flow of knowledge is re-
lated to design practices and to the view of the user held by usabil-
ity professionals and potential ways of subverting these.
When we subordinate usability to the goals of institutions and
the short term goals of users, we actually persist in reinforcing a
false consciousness of power that is actually invested in Tayloristic
goals of productivity and efficiency, concepts that do not liberate
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the user but instead subordinate the user to institutional goals as
well; if usability is subordinated, then so the user will be.
Oen certain programmers and engineers refer, not quite seri-
ously, to end-users as “stupid.” While this appears to be a rejected
perspective in usability engineering, it may be time to rethink that.
Perhaps users really are stupid, stupid in that their level of under-
standing prevents them from obtaining a level of autonomy from
the systems they use, but rather they are subordinated to an insti-
tutional idea of tasks and goals. And perhaps this is partly because
users have been constructed that way by those who design user
interfaces. Perhaps making a more difficult user interface is not so
bad; perhaps “ease-of-use” is not an end in itself. In any case, it
is time to reevaluate how usability professionals affect the world
through their paradigms and decisions.
4.1 Practicality
In several previous sections, I have mentioned examples of where
the existing concepts of usability engineering serve to subordinate
the user and points at which this control can be broken. But an
important remaining question is how the usability practitioner can
actually take advantage of these points if he or she is so inclined. A
major topic I have avoided dealing with so far is the reward system
by which usability specialists are formed into a discipline. Usabil-
ity professionals are ultimately hired to perform tasks that their
employers and clients require them to do and expect them to per-
form within the material and ideological bounds that benefit them.
A subversive practice of usability engineering in which efficiency
and productivity are not given primacy may ultimately be impos-
sible for usability professionals to implement in real life in a large,
obvious, and direct scale.
Nevertheless, the very act of discussing such a subversive prac-
tice in an environment where the institutional goals of usability
engineering are assumed is itself useful and important. It trans-
gresses against the boundaries of usability discourse that are al-
ready set. Eventually, it may result in small acts of user empower-
ment that may grow over time.
Perhaps a subversive usability practice can exist. Perhaps it ex-
ists already in the freewheeling development of freeware tools. We
shall see.
4.2 Subversion
So all this leaves a final question: what research directions to take
from this point? At the moment, the way to a truly transgressive
practice of usability engineering is not clear at all. While a new
way of looking at user interface design heuristics and a new way
of looking at the users themselves are very well and good, there
is still yet another component that needs to be inserted into the
equation: the usability engineers. We need a new way of looking
at usability engineering as a discipline. For instance, when they are
not merely copying the interfaces of popular Microso Windows
products, the freewheeling processes that underlie the building of
user interfaces for Unix/Linux-based open source freeware appear
to produce somewhat “messier” user interfaces, but ones in which
the user oen has far more control about the nature of her work
and her interactions with the system. It is as though the undis-
ciplined processes of open source soware design by their very
nature produce interfaces more conducive to user learning and
to user autonomy. Further work is therefore required to discuss
whether or not open source interfaces really are more conducive
to end user autonomy, in what ways this is so, and what specific
characteristics of open source design processes tend to produce
these effects.
If usability engineering is ever to achieve a point where a prac-
tice that helps to subvert existing power relationships in society
can emerge, then it is necessary to investigate power relationships
involved in the current practice of usability engineering. Let the
user no longer be used.
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